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Survey measures of preference parameters provide a means for accounting for otherwise unobserved
heterogeneity.This paper presents measures of relative risk tolerance based on responses to survey
questions about hypothetical gambles over lifetime income.It discusses how to impute estimates of
utility function parameters from the survey responses using a statistical model that accounts for survey
response error.  There is substantial heterogeneity in true preference parameters even after survey response
error is taken into account.The paper discusses how to use the preference parameters imputed from
the survey responses in regression models as a control for differences in preferences across individuals.
This paper focuses on imputations for respondents in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).It
also studies the covariation of risk preferences among members of households.It finds fairly strong
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Unobserved heterogeneity greatly complicates empirical analysis in economics.  Unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences is particularly troublesome because there are so few theoretical 
restrictions on the distribution of preference parameters in the population.  Therefore, despite 
potential pitfalls, we have developed direct survey measures of preference parameters based on 
hypothetical choices and econometric techniques for dealing with the inevitable measurement 
error in any such measures. Our work on survey measures of preference parameters focuses on 
risk tolerance (Robert B. Barsky, F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball, and Matthew D. Shapiro 
1997 [BJKS hereafter] and Kimball, Claudia R. Sahm, and Shapiro 2008 [KSS hereafter]), time 
preference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (BJKS), and labor supply elasticities 
(Kimball and Shapiro 2008).  
Risk tolerance is central to portfolio choice and many other economic decisions, such as 
choices about insurance and career choices.  In this paper, we discuss how to go from categorical 
survey responses to imputed values of preference parameters.  The procedure takes into account 
measurement error from survey response, and has implications for the appropriate use of imputed 
preference parameters in econometric analysis. We present the risk tolerance imputations for the 
survey responses in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  We also present quantitative 
evidence on the covariation in risk preferences within families.  
I.  Survey Measures of Risk Preferences 
Numerous surveys have fielded measures of an individual’s willingness to take risk, including 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which pioneered the use of hypothetical gambles in a 
large survey to measure the economic preference parameter of risk tolerance (BJKS 1997).  In   2
this paper, we analyze the gambles fielded in the 1996 PSID that ask respondents the following
1: 
Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your current, total 
income. And that job was (your/your family's) only source of income. Then you are given 
the opportunity to take a new, and equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double 
your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income 
and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?    
Individuals who answered that they would take this risky job were then asked about a riskier job: 
Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, 
and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job? 
In contrast, individuals who would not take the initial risky job were asked about a less risky job: 
Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, 
and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 percent. Then, would you take the new job? 
Conditional on their first two responses, individuals are asked to consider a risky job with either 
a 75 percent downside risk or a 10 percent downside risk.  These responses allow us to order 
individuals into six categories.  Unlike the HRS, the PSID only asked these questions of working 
family respondents and did not ask them of other household members.  The targeting of the 
questions to workers in the PSID particularly affects the selection of the youngest and oldest 
respondents, so we have limited our analysis to respondents between the ages of 20 and 69.   
After collecting over ten years of gamble responses in the HRS and similar questions in 
surveys like the PSID and the National Longitudinal Survey, a number of lessons on measuring 
risk preferences have emerged.  First, the gamble responses are subject to considerable 
measurement error.  KSS report a rank correlation in the gamble response categories of 0.27 
                                                 
1 This question was included in the 1996 PSID (both original respondents and offsprings in split-
off households).    3
across individuals’ responses in the first two waves of the HRS.  In addition, Sahm (2007) shows 
that much of the transitory variation in the gamble responses remains unexplained even after 
including a rich set of individual and household covariates.   To address the problem of 
measurement error, BJKS (1997), KSS (2008), Sahm (2007), and this paper use multiple 
responses from some individuals to isolate the variance owing to measurement error from the 
variance in true risk preference.   
Second, extraneous details in the description of the gambles can affect the measurement of 
risk preferences.  For example, in the original HRS version and the PSID version of the question, 
the risky job is described as a new job.  This frame has the potential to induce status quo bias in 
which individuals are averse to taking the new job independent from its income risk.  Starting in 
the 1998 wave, the HRS addressed this potential problem by using a scenario in which the 
individual has to move for health reasons and is given a choice between two new jobs.  This 
variation in the question wording in the HRS also allows us to estimate the degree of status quo 
bias in the original version and to correct the estimates of risk tolerance from the PSID.  Finally, 
the interpretation of a job-related gamble may vary across workers who are at different stages of 
their career.  In designing the question, a choice of jobs was used to create a large shock to 
lifetime resources.  The fraction of lifetime income associated with labor income, however, 
likely declines with age.  The job gamble may be particularly hard for retirees and other non-
workers to interpret.  The HRS now uses an investment gamble related to an unexpected 
inheritance for respondents age 65 and older, and gives the job-gamble question only to those 
under age 65.  Similarly, the PSID targeted its job-related question only to workers.   
II.  Individual Imputations 
The responses to hypothetical gambles in the PSID suggest that most individuals have a low   4
tolerance for risk, though there is substantial heterogeneity.   The first column of Table 1 shows 
that 31 percent of the respondents rejected all of the risky jobs, but almost 7 percent accepted all 
the risky jobs.  An advantage of the hypothetical gambles relative to qualitative measures of risk 
tolerance is that one can use them to quantify the degree of risk tolerance and its dispersion 
across individuals.  As in BJKS and KSS, we assume that individuals have constant relative risk 
aversion utility and will reject the risky job when its expected utility is less than that of the safe 
job.  Along with the risks specified in the questions, these assumptions allow us to assign a range 
for the coefficient of relative risk tolerance to each gamble response category.  Previous analysis 
from the panel of gambles in the HRS suggests that these questions provide a noisy signal of risk 
tolerance reflecting both status quo bias and classical measurement error.  Therefore, we estimate 
a model of noisy log risk tolerance, log e ξ θ = + , where log θ is distributed  ()
2 , x N μ σ  and the e 
is classical measurement error distributed  ( )
2 0, e N σ .  The KSS estimation procedure is an 
ordered probit with know cutoffs based on which gambles respondents accept or reject.  
With only a single response from each PSID respondent, it is not possible to identify 
separately the variance of true log risk tolerance and the variance of the response error.  The 
PSID responses identify the mean and the total variance of the noisy signal ξ .  We impose the 
estimate of the variance of true log tolerance 
2
x σ  from the HRS to divide the PSID total variance 
into variance of true preferences and variance of error.  For the PSID, the estimates of the 
parameters are μ =-1.05, 
2
x σ =0.76, and 
2
e σ =1.69.
2  Using these distributional parameters, we 
can impute individual-level estimates of preference parameters based on the conditional 
                                                 
2 The PSID responses are also adjusted by -0.21 for status quo bias (again using the parameter 
estimated in the HRS).  See the unpublished appendix to this paper, KSS, and 
http://www.umich.edu/~shapiro/data/risk_preference/ for details of the estimation and 
imputation procedures.      5
expectation of the true parameter given the individuals’ survey responses. Table 1 provides the 
individual imputations for the PSID.  The conditional expectation of each preference parameter 
is computed using the moment generating function, so as shown in the last two columns, the 
reciprocal of imputed risk tolerance is not equal to imputed risk aversion.  Researchers interested 
in studying differences in risky behavior can use these individual imputations as a covariate.  The 
Table 1.  Risk Tolerance in the PSID 
Imputatations
   1 30.9 -1.60 0.27 6.7
   2 18.2 -1.18 0.40 4.2
   3 15.6 -0.98 0.49 3.5
   4 15.0 -0.77 0.60 2.8
   5 13.7 -0.50 0.79 2.2












imputations offer advantages relative to categorical controls for gamble responses.  First, the 
imputations summarize the sequence of gamble responses in a single cardinal measure of 
preferences that can be used to assess the quantitative predictions of behavioral models. Second, 
our estimation procedure accounts for the measurement error in the survey responses, so the 
imputations are the conditional expectations of the individual’s true preferences.  The use of the 
imputed values in regression analysis substantially reduces the attenuation bias arising from 
survey response error when the imputed values of risk tolerance are used as explanatory 
variables.  Nonetheless, these imputations conditioning only on individual’s gamble responses 
understate the true variation in preferences, so they may not capture all of the relevant 
differences in risk attitudes across individuals and would only partially control for risk tolerance 
in OLS estimation. 
The application in KSS that uses individual imputations (as in Table 1) to study stock   6
ownership makes these points more concrete.  Using categorical controls for the gamble response 
category or imputations that do not account for response error leads to an attenuation bias that 
can substantially understate the responsiveness of behavior to risk tolerance.  Even with 
imputations that address response error, standard multivariate estimators may not be consistent 
due to a nonstandard errors-in-variables problem.
3  The main issue is that the imputations based 
on gamble responses do not capture all the differences in true risk tolerance. To the extent that 
other covariates are correlated with the unmeasured part of risk tolerance, they will be correlated 
with the error term in the OLS regression that includes the imputations.  Thus, the estimated 
coefficients on the other covariates would also include the indirect effects of risk tolerance.  To 
address this issue, KSS provide a consistent GMM estimator using the imputations that scales up 
the covariance between imputed risk tolerance and other covariates.
4  As an example of the 
difference this correction makes, compared to OLS, the estimated difference in stock ownership 
rates between men and women is 40 percent lower with the GMM estimator and is no longer 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
The PSID illustrates how preference parameters can differ according to values of covariates.  
In particular, there are important differences in measured risk preference by age.  For example, 
61 percent of the individuals in their sixties reject all of the risky jobs versus only 23 percent of 
individuals in their twenties.  As Table 2 shows, this pattern holds across all six gamble response 
categories with older individuals more concentrated in lower, less risk tolerant categories.   The 
                                                 
3 In univariate analysis, the estimated effect of risk tolerance on the behavior of interest would be 
consistent, but the R-squared would be underestimated. 
4 The scaling factor is the variance of true risk tolerance divided by the variance of imputed risk 
tolerance.  This true-to-proxy variance ratio is 6.3 in the HRS and 4.6 in the PSID.      7
interpretation of such age effects remains open.
5  One possibility is that risk tolerance, in terms 
of the curvature of the utility function, diminishes with age.  Alternatively, consumption 
commitments or habits may increase with age and make individuals less willing to risk a loss in 
income.  Finally, the interpretation of the job-related gamble may simply vary with age in a way 
that is unrelated to true risk preferences. In any case, when the individual imputations also  
Table 2.  Distribution of Gamble Responses by Age 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69
   1 22.7 27.8 30.5 44.6 60.6
   2 18.7 18.5 18.8 16.9 13.4
   3 15.9 16.1 16.5 13.3 9.3
   4 17.8 16.3 15.5 8.0 6.5
   5 17.3 13.9 13.0 11.6 4.9
   6 7.6 7.4 5.6 5.5 5.3
Response 
Category
Percent by Age Group
 
condition on age the differences are sizeable.  For example, conditioning on age in addition to 
the gamble response category, a 30-year old in the least risk tolerant category has an imputed 
risk tolerance of 0.25, whereas a 50-year old with the same gamble responses has an imputed risk 
tolerance of 0.16.  One option would be to impute risk tolerance to individuals based on both 
their gamble response category and their age. This method constrains researchers who want to 
use the imputation as a covariate in behavioral studies.  The specification of age effects in the 
behavioral model has to match those in the risk tolerance estimation or a spurious correlation 
between imputed risk tolerance and the behavior under study could arise.  In the application in 
the next section, we use a rough control for differences in ages.  
In summary, Table 1 provides imputed values of risk preference parameters based on 
                                                 
5 With a cross-section of responses, the distribution of gamble responses by age may also 
incorporate differences in risk tolerance across birth cohorts.  Malmendier and Nagel (2008) find 
an association between individuals’ current willingness to take financial risks and the path of 
aggregate stock market returns experienced over their lifetimes.     8
responses to a hypothetical gamble about lifetime income in the PSID.  The imputations control 
for survey response error.  Neglecting this response error will substantially understate the 
correlation of survey measures of risk preferences with other variables.  KSS show how to use 
such imputed values in multiple regressions—either by imputing the preference parameters 
based on multiple covariates or by using a GMM procedure that adjusts for the fact that the 
imputed values do not capture all the cross-sectional variation in the true preferences.   
III.  Family Covariation 
We now apply the methodology sketched in Section II to study the covariation in preferences 
among family members.  The PSID has risk preference responses from members of different 
generations of the same families and the HRS has responses from both spouses.   
We use our maximum-likelihood approach to quantify the covariation in family members’ 
preferences.  Consider the correlation in risk tolerance between a father f and his adult child c.  
Because of the differences across age documented in Table 2, we allow the mean and variance of 
noisy log risk tolerance ξ to differ across fathers and children, such that  ( )
2 , ~ f f f N σ μ ξ  
and ( )
2 , ~ c c c N σ μ ξ  where, as above, the variances are sums of the variance of the true parameter 
logθ  and of the response error e.
6  Because the response errors e are uncorrelated across family 
members, we can estimate  ()
2 Cov , f cf c ξ ξσ =  .  
The numbers below the diagonal in Table 3 present the variance-covariance matrix of log 
risk tolerance for various family members (standard errors in parentheses).  The numbers above 
the diagonal (in bold) are correlation coefficients.  The main diagonal is the variance of true log 
risk tolerance (from estimates presented in Section II). We find a positive association between 
                                                 
6 An alternative parameterization would be to allow the differences of means of log risk 
tolerance μ  to be functions of the differences in ages in the family pairs.   9
parents and their adult children.  The correspondence between fathers and their children is 
Table 3.  Family Covariation in Log Risk Tolerance 
Father Mother Child 1 Child 2
Father 0.76 0.41 0.14 0.14
(0.07)
Mother 0.32 0.76 0.23 0.23
(0.13) (0.07)
Child 1 0.11 0.18 0.76 0.48
(0.13) (0.11) (0.03)
Child 2 0.11 0.18 0.37 0.76
(0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.03)
Variance-Covariance \ Correlation 
 
relatively weak, though positive.  The mother-child covariance is over 60 percent larger than the 
father-child covariance and is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level.
7   The 
mother-child covariance is over one-fifth of the within-person variance.   We do not find a 
stronger correlation between parents and children of the same gender.  The correlations are 
noteworthy given the fact that parents and children with an average age difference of over 20 
years are at very different life stages and in most cases have not resided together for some time.  
The role of the family in shaping risk preferences is even more apparent in the gamble responses 
of siblings.  Again, each adult sibling in the pair is either the head or spouse in an independent 
family when answering the gambles.  The covariance in risk tolerance among siblings is more 
than twice the size of the mother-child covariance and is almost 50 percent of the within-person 
variance.  The average age difference between the siblings is only 5 years, which likely makes 
their interpretation of the gambles more comparable.  Clearly, there are a number of factors that 
could lead siblings to form similar risk preferences: transmission from common parents, shared 
                                                 
7 The standard deviation of the common mother-child component in log risk tolerance is 
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.  (The 95% confidence interval of the 
standard deviation and the 95% confidence interval of the variance cover non-equivalent regions 
of the parameter space.)  
  10
experiences within the family, and similar peer and social environments.
8  
The HRS offers one more dimension of within family variation, since it poses the gamble to 
both the husband and wife in a household.
9   We find a covariance between spouses that is 
similar to the covariance between siblings and is about 40 percent of the within person variation.  
Both assortative mating and common experiences in the marriage could help account for the 
correlation.    
The substantial covariance within families is also important for interpreting the variance of 
risk tolerance on the main diagonal in Table 3.  The estimated variance from the HRS uses the 
persistent component of individuals’ gamble responses over time to identify risk preference.  It is 
possible that a repeated misinterpretation of the question could lead to persistent measurement 
error that then would bias upward the estimated variance of true risk tolerance.  The size of the 
sibling and spousal covariances makes it unlikely that the true variance of risk tolerance on the 
main diagonal is much smaller.  In other words, the size of the sibling and spousal covariances 
leaves little room for a large variance of persistent idiosyncratic response error.   This finding is 
important because there are few other ways to get a handle on the variance of persistent 
idiosyncratic response error.   
Our results showing a correlation in risk preferences among family members are largely 
consistent with related studies.  Using a subset of the PSID gamble responses in their study on 
the intergenerational transmission of wealth, Kerwin K. Charles and Erik Hurst (2003) find a 
                                                 
8 Looking for some evidence on these factors, we tested for a difference in the covariance for 
siblings who share both parents as opposed to those who share only one parent.  The difference 
was statistically insignificant. 
9 One complication is that a spouse is sometimes present during the HRS interview which might 
bias an individual’s response and lead to a spurious correlation in gamble responses.  We limit 
our analysis to pairs of responses that were given in separate interviews in 1992.  This may 
understate the true correlation if spouses with similar preferences choose to be together during 
interviews more than those with dissimilar preferences.  11
strong correspondence between parent and child risk tolerance, particularly at the tails of the 
distribution.  They make sample restrictions that result in a more homogeneous group of parent 
and child households that leads to a stronger parent-child correlation than we find in the full 
sample. Nonetheless, the basic finding of intergenerational transmission in risk preferences is 
similar.
10  Thomas J. Dohmen et al. (2008) use experimentally-validated qualitative measures of 
willingness to take risk in the German Socioeconomic Panel to also show that parents and 
children, as well as married couples, have similar attitudes toward risk.   
IV.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we apply a survey-based method for imputing individual risk preferences to 
respondents in the PSID.  These procedures draw on estimates and previous lessons from 
analysis of the HRS gamble responses.  We provide individual estimates of risk preferences 
based on the gamble response categories that can be used in other behavioral studies—both to 
study the effects of risk tolerance and to control for risk tolerance when looking at other effects.  
We use the gamble responses to document a substantial covariance in risk preferences among 
family members.   In addition to its intrinsic interest, this covariance in risk preferences across 
family members helps validate these risk tolerance measures by putting an upper bound on the 
variance of idiosyncratic response error. 
                                                 
10 Charles and Hurst (2003) use a different method for assessing the covariation in preferences 
across parents and children.  Applying our maximum likelihood procedure to their restricted 
sample of parent-child pairs yields a covariance of 0.25 (standard error of 0.12).  The point 
estimate from their parent-child sample is higher than our parent-child covariance estimate of 




This appendix provides additional details on our maximum-likelihood estimates of risk tolerance 
in the PSID.  For a more thorough discussion of the general approach, see Kimball et al., 
“Imputing Risk Tolerance from Survey Responses” (2008) Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 103(483) 1028-38.  Further information on using the imputations is provided at 
http://www.umich.edu/~shapiro/data/risk_preference 
 
A-I.  Interpreting Gamble Responses 
 
The 1996 PSID poses up to three hypothetical gambles to family respondents who are working at 
the time of the survey.  The gambles differ only by the downside risk associated with the risky 
job.  Specifically, individuals choose between a job that guarantees their current lifetime income 
and one that offers a 50-50 chance of doubling their lifetime income and a 50-50 chance of 
cutting it by a fraction π.  We assume that an individual accepts the risky job only if its expected 
utility exceeds that of the certain job, thus individuals with higher risk tolerance θ are willing to 
accept jobs with higher downside risk π.  With constant relative risk aversion, 
) / 1 1 /( ) 1 ( ) (
/ 1 1 θ
θ − − =
− C C U , gamble responses further imply an upper and lower bound on an 
individual’s risk tolerance in the absence of response error.  Table A-1 defines the gamble 
response categories in terms of the smallest downside risk rejected and the highest downside risk 
accepted.  The last two columns provide the bounds on relative risk tolerance consistent with 
these categories.  
 
Table A-1: Risk Tolerance Response Categories
Accepted Rejected Lower Upper
1 None 1/10 0 0.13
2 1/10 1/5 0.13 0.27
3 1/5 1/3 0.27 0.50
4 1/3 1/2 0.50 1.00
5 1/2 3/4 1.00 3.27
6 3/4 None 3.27 ∞
Response 
Category
Downside Risk of 
Risky Job
Bounds on Risk 
Tolerance
 
The response category is our summary statistic of an individual’s sequence of gamble responses 
and we use the implied bounds on risk tolerance in the maximum-likelihood estimation as the 
known cut points for an ordered probit (interval regression). 
 
A-II.  Statistical Model and Estimation of Risk Tolerance 
 
To translate the bounds on response categories to a parameter estimate, we first assume that risk 
tolerance is log-normally distributed,  
  13
( )
2 , ~ log x N x σ μ θ = ,                  (1) 
 
which corresponds well with the fact that the modal gamble response implies low risk tolerance, 
but there is substantial heterogeneity across individuals.  Previous analysis of individuals who 
answered the gambles repeatedly over several waves of the HRS suggests that the survey 
responses provide a noisy signal of risk tolerance.  Therefore, we estimate a model of noisy log 
risk tolerance from the gamble responses:
11 
 
e b + + = + = θ ε θ ξ log log                  (2) 
 
The survey response error ε includes both a time-constant status quo bias term b and a transitory 
classical measurement error term ( )
2 , 0 ~ e N e σ .  For individuals in the PSID, the probability of 
being in response category j is 
 
             ()
22 22
log log









⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −− −−
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ == < < = Φ − Φ
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
       (3) 
 
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function.  However, with only a single response 
from each PSID respondent, it is not possible to separately identify the variance of true log risk 
tolerance 
2
x σ  from the variance of the response error 
2
e σ  or to estimate the status quo bias 
induced by the new/risky job wording.  Thus with the PSID gamble responses, we first estimate 
the mean  b + = μ μξ  and variance 
2 2 2
e x σ σ σξ + = of the noisy signal ξ.  The first column of Table 
A-2 provides the estimates from the PSID that ignore survey response error.  The second column 
provides the estimates from the HRS panel that account for survey response error.
12  Some HRS 
respondents answer the gambles in more than one wave, so the variance of true risk tolerance is 
identified by the covariance in an individual’s gamble responses at two points in time.  This 
identification requires that the measurement error in the gamble responses is transitory and that 
preferences are the only source of persistence in the gamble responses.  The status quo bias is 
identified in the HRS, since there are two versions of the question—one in which only the risky 
job is new and one in which both the certain and the risky jobs are new.  The final column of 
Table A-2 shows the estimated distribution of risk tolerance in the PSID that incorporates the 
estimated variance of true risk tolerance and status quo bias from the HRS.  The mean of true log 
risk tolerance is higher and the variance is considerably smaller than in the first column where 
there is no correction for measurement error. 
 
                                                 
11 To simplify notation, the model equations in the text did not explicitly include the status quo bias term b.   
12 The HRS sample for the estimation in this paper includes original HRS respondents who were between ages 20-69 
in 1992 and who were working for pay when they answered the gamble question.  Gamble responses from the 1992, 
1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002 HRS are included in the panel only if the respondent is working at the time of the 
interview.  In addition, we require a valid gamble response in 1992 to be in the HRS sample.  The sample from the 
HRS used in this paper differs from that used in Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008).  That study does not impose 
age limits and it includes all respondents, not just those working for pay when they answered the gamble question.   14














Log of risk tolerance
   Mean -1.26 -1.77 -1.05
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
   Variance 2.46 0.76 0.76
(0.07) (0.07) -
Status-quo bias -0.21 -0.21
(0.04) -
Transitory response error
   Variance 2.03 1.69
(0.07) (0.07)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in paretheses.  The PSID sample includes 
5,466 respondents in the 1996 PSID.  The HRS sample includes 7,648 




A-III.  Individual Imputations 
 
Table 1 in the text provides imputations of risk preferences for each of the gamble response 
categories.  These imputations are the expected value of an individual’s risk preference 
conditional on his or her gamble response category.  We use the parameter estimates from the 
final column of Table A-2 and the following formulas to compute the conditional expectations, 
which rely on the log-normality of risk tolerance.   
 
The conditional expectation of log risk tolerance for individuals in response category c is 
 
    
   
E(logθ |c) = μ + σ x
2 / σξ ()
φ (logθ j − μ − b)/σξ () −φ (logθ j − μ − b)/σξ ( )
Φ (logθ j − μ − b)/σξ () −Φ (logθ j − μ − b)/σξ ()
           (4) 
 
whereφ is the standard normal density function.  Using the moment-generating function, the 
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γμ σ
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Φ− − − Φ− −
   (6) 
            
Again, the formulas for the conditional expectations make clear that the imputation of risk 
aversion is not simply the reciprocal of the imputation of risk tolerance.   
 
 
A-IV.  Family Estimation 
 
We use the unique intergenerational structure of the PSID to examine the covariation of risk 
preferences within families.  We use pair-wise comparisons of gamble responses from two 
different types of family members, such as adult children and their fathers.  Similar to the 
statistical model of Section A-II, we model the noisy signal of risk tolerance from the first family 
member’s gamble response as 
 
) , ( ~ log
2
1 1 1 1 1 ξ ξ σ μ ε θ ξ N + =                  (7) 
We allow the second family member to have a different mean and variance: 
) , ( ~ log
2
2 2 2 2 2 ξ ξ σ μ ε θ ξ N + =                  (8) 
The main parameter of interest (reported in Table 3 in the text) is the covariance between family 
members  ()
2
12 1 2 Cov , ξξ σ = .  We assume that the response errors are uncorrelated across family 
members, so the covariance term reflects the covariation in true risk preferences.  There are two 
gamble responses observed for each family, so the likelihood of family member 1 being in 
gamble response category j and family member 2 being in response category k is calculated as  
 
 
     












 is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, ρ is the correlation between 
the two family members,  1 11 (log )/ ) jj N ξ θ μσ =− 1 11 (log )/ ) jj N ξ θ μσ = − , 
2 22 (log )/ ) kk N ξ θμσ =− and  2 22 (log )/ ) kk N ξ θ μσ =− .
13  With two gamble responses from the 
same family we can identify the family covariance term; however, with only one response from 
each individual we cannot separate the idiosyncratic variance of true risk tolerance from the 
variance of response errors.  Likewise, with the family pairs, we cannot estimate the status quo 
bias, since we only have responses to the “new job” version of the question.   
 
Table A-3 provides the estimated distribution of risk tolerance for the various family members.  
As in Table A-2, we adjust the estimates from the family member pairs with the variance of true 
                                                 
13 The estimator uses Gaussian quadrature to approximate the probability in equation (9).   16
log risk tolerance and the status quo bias estimated in the HRS.  We assume that the values of 
these two calibrated parameters are the same for all family members. 
     
The row labeled “Pair-Specific” Variance provides the estimates that are reported (below the 
diagonal) in Table 3 in the text.  In line with the age effects discussed in the text, the mean risk 











Log of risk tolerance
   Mean, 1st in Pair -0.71 -0.76 -0.91 -1.64
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09)
   Mean, 2st in Pair -1.60 -1.79 -1.05 -1.65
(0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10)
   Variance 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
----
       Idiosyncratic 0.65 0.59 0.39 0.45
----
       Pair-Specific 0.11 0.18 0.37 0.32
(0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.13)
Status Quo Bias -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
----
Transitory Response Error
   Variance, 1st in Pair 1.38 1.31 1.83 1.36
(0.20) (0.17) (0.11) (0.28)
   Variance, 2st in Pair 2.91 2.08 1.83 1.91
(0.38) (0.25) (0.11) (0.36)
Number of Pairs 557 757 2,300 710
Mean age diffierence 26 23 5 7
   (Standard deviation) (5) (5) (4) (5)
Table A-3: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Family Members
Family Member Pairs
Note: The estimates above use the total variance of true log risk tolerance (equal to 0.76) and the 
status quo bias from the HRS and assume that these two parameters are the same for all family 
members.  The gambles responses of parents, adult children, and adult siblings are from the 1996 
PSID.  The gamble responses of spouses (not interrviewed together) are from the 1992 HRS.  Each 
column is a separate estimation.  
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A-V.  Survey Questions in PSID and HRS 
 
Both the PSID and HRS pose the gamble as a choice between two jobs.  The wording of the 
PSID question is similar to the original version of the HRS question.   
 
Specifically, the PSID asks: 
 
Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your current, total 
income. And that job was (your/your family's) only source of income. Then you are given 
the opportunity to take a new, and equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double 
your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income 
and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?    
 
Similarly, the 1992 and 1994 HRS asks: 
 
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job 
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life.  You are given the 
opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will double your 
(family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third.  Would 
you take the new job? 
 
Starting in 1998, the HRS modified the frame of the question to avoid the potential for status quo 
bias: 
 
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family.  Your doctor recommends that 
you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible jobs.  The 
first would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is possibly 
better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the second job 
would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it by a third.  
Which job would you take—the first job or the second job? 
 
The italics (added here) highlight the main difference in the questions. Status quo bias is 
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